Western support has been vital in Ukraine’s fight against Russia. Yet, this support has shown increased strain, raising stark questions about Ukraine’s sovereignty. NGS Associate Analyst, Jason Cooper, explores the consequences of rising US isolationism, which threatens numerous operational concerns from further territorial revisionism to  supply chain disruption.

Introduction

Since Russia’s war with Ukraine began back in 2014, Western support has been crucial to keeping Ukraine a sovereign nation. This has become even more apparent since the war erupted in 2022. From 2022 onwards, the US has given Ukraine upwards of USD75bn of aid, a large proportion of which, USD46bn, has come in the form of military aid. Alongside the US, the EU has also supplied large quantities of aid to Ukraine as they continue to struggle against Russian advances. Such funding has been essential in the provision of Ukrainian social programs and servicing its military. However, cracks have surfaced in the Western alliance and its funding to Ukraine has started to dry up. This raises stark questions for Ukraine’s war effort, and ultimately an array of security and socioeconomic concerns.

Donald Trump, the Republican Party and Ukraine

Through the autumn of 2023, Joe Biden and the Democrats have sought to release funding to Ukraine to support the nation against Russia. However, slipping support for Ukraine amongst US voters, in particular Republicans, has enabled their isolationist wing to actively block funding. According to a Gallup poll in the autumn of 2023, 62% of Republican voters believe that the US is offering too much support for Ukraine, up from 50% in June 2023. A driving factor in this shift in Republican sentiments is the rhetoric of Donald Trump.

Isolationist tendencies defined Trump’s first term as president, epitomised by his “America First” policy. This approach pulled the handbrake on globalisation and prioritised national interests over those of its allies. In the face of increased aggression from Russia and China since 2021, Trump has doubled down on isolationism. Trump’s choice of words over NATO and US funding for ‘European Wars’ completely shifts the traditional landscape of European security by distancing it from America’s interests. This vocal criticism represents a clear sea change in the long-standing agreements linking Europe’s security with that of the United States.  Worse still, whilst campaigning in South Carolina, Trump recently suggested the West’s enemies can “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO nations who don’t pull their weight, namely spending 2% of GDP on Defence spending. Explicit messaging like this only widens the growing gaps between the US and NATO’s European members.

Despite being out of office, Trump’s influence over the Republican party has blocked Biden’s efforts to support Ukraine. A USD95bn foreign aid bill – USD60bn of which is allocated for Ukraine – narrowly passed the Senate but is facing stark opposition by Republicans in the House. Speaker of the House Mike Johnson instantly tempered expectations on whether the bill would even reach the debating floor of the House of Representatives, let alone reach a vote. Republicans are ultimately sceptical of the scale of such financial commitments, and instead place priority on securing the US’s southern border. Complicating matters further, the bill also faces hurdles from Democrats in the House, who are uneasy with over USD14.1bn being earmarked for Israel (to aid its war effort against Hamas).

Continued US funding for Ukraine and NATO more generally is crucial for keeping Russia in check, as their doctrine of buffer states likely cannot be battled without US aid. To fully understand this, it is crucial to grasp the wider context of Russia’s stance towards its western borders. Russia’s aggression began in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the situation in this area remained volatile until large-scale fighting began again in 2022. The history of invasions from the west into Russia, coupled with Putin’s revisionist history, helps explain why the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe has created a scenario where Putin has felt it necessary to aggressively push into Ukraine. The Russian doctrine of buffer states which Putin has so effectively pursued explains the political situations in the likes of Hungary and Ukraine before 2014. One must only look at the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 to understand that even if Western nations were to withdraw support for Ukraine Putin would not suddenly change his attitude.

Thus, whilst the US remains the only nation capable of sufficiently funding Ukraine it must continue to do so. Following decades of relying on the US, European nations do not have the military infrastructure in place to fund Ukraine alone, and they need to significantly bolster their defences before being able to support Ukraine, especially if the US is going to lessen its aid to allies. Concerningly, Putin may see an opportunity to press into other Eastern European states such as the Baltic nations if he is able to overcome Ukraine.

The Impact of Reduced US Support for Ukraine’s Territorial Integrity and its Wider Geopolitical Consequences

• Russian territorial gains: If the Democrats fail to secure more funding for Ukraine, then the outcome of this conflict will likely be the same as Putin’s first attempt at claiming Ukrainian land. If the funding was to be blocked by the House of Representatives, then a renewed Russian offensive over the summer could come with devastating effects. Though it seems unlikely that Ukraine is going to be able to take back the territory in Luhansk and Donetsk that they have lost, with support from the West they should be able to prevent any further large territorial losses in their Eastern provinces. However, without the required funding and military resources, Ukraine will be vulnerable to Russian advances.  If breakthroughs were to happen along the front Ukraine could see all its valiant resistance be overshadowed. Thus, whilst some in the West would like to see a swift and peaceful end to the war, if Ukraine was to struggle on without the support of the US then the outcome would likely be disastrous for them and see great loss of Ukrainian life and further Russian territorial gains.

• Peace difficulties: Perhaps somewhat perversely, the peace negotiations that would see this conflict come to an end rely heavily on American funding. US funding is vital to Ukraine’s continued resistance to Russia and is thus a major bargaining chip in any peace talks. If the US continues to support Ukraine, then the likelihood of a Russian victory significantly decreases. This is an important aspect of Ukraine’s ability to negotiate from a strong position. If Russian losses continue to mount and economic factors take a higher toll on Russia, then Putin may be forced to consider peace terms that return some Ukrainian land or at the very least prevent further annexation.

However, if Putin sees an opportunity to topple Zelensky and bring Ukraine back into his orbit as America pulls back then Ukraine will likely find any terms offered to be crippling. This coupled with the looming possibility of Donald Trump returning to office and withdrawing support to a greater level, the need for American funding in the spring becomes even clearer. As is often the case in geopolitics, one eye will be keenly focused on the US as the direction they take will drive the outcome of this conflict and thus drastically affect Eastern Europe and further afield.

• Further territorial revisionism: As America continues to step away from its role as the ‘world’s policemen’ the need for such a power is only likely to grow. At present Russian aggression has been focused on Ukraine. However, if Putin believes that the West will no longer resist him this may cause him to turn his eye to other Eastern European states. The most obvious nations that will find this concerning are the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Similarly to Ukraine, these nations share significant borders with Russia and Belarus. Lithuania even has the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad to its West, an added complication. All three Baltic states are NATO members, however, if Trump were to abandon those who don’t hit their 2% funding target Russia may see an opportunity to expand its influence further. Thus, if Trump does become President again it will be worth keeping an eye on Baltic military spending and Trump’s rhetoric towards these ‘allies’.

The secondary conflict that this could encourage involves China. China has continued a threatening stance towards Taiwan and it is clear that the backing of the US is a key factor deterring China from invading the island nation. Should the US turn its back on its lopsided relations, then China may see this as an opportunity to re-integrate Taiwan into mainland China. If the US, even under the Republicans, intend to continue supporting allies with military aid, their isolationist rhetoric could lead to extra conflicts in other continents further stretching the US budget. Therefore, if renewing outward support for allies in NATO and Asia can prevent conflict, it may be the cheaper route. The major impact a conflict in Taiwan could have is an economic one and these effects from conflicts will be explored below.

• Wider economic instability: As mentioned above, the instability caused by US isolationism could contribute to greater levels of economic instability across the globe. The effects of conflict with Russia have already been seen throughout Europe in the form of increased energy prices and other issues related to Western sanctions on Russia. Should the US commit to isolationism, China would likely be incentivised to commit hostile actions that threaten clashes with American allies. Taiwan would be particularly vulnerable to Chinese aggression.  Due to the size and nature of Taiwan, it is unlikely that there would be a protracted conflict.  Any conflict would however likely impact the operations of Taiwanese industries, including the key industry for the modern economy, microchips. Taiwan is the world’s primary manufacturer of semiconductors, vital for modern technology, accounting for 60% of the world’s output and 90% of its most developed types.

Any conflict that cut off this supply from the West could have devastating effects on Western economies. This helps explain why Taiwan’s chip industry is often known as its ‘silicon shield’. The efficacy of this ‘shield’ relies on China believing the US would defend Taiwan from invasion. If this is no longer the case China may choose to invade disrupting one of the world’s most crucial supply chains. This helps to also explain why both China and the US are investing considerable amounts of money (upwards of USD40bn each) in their chip-making capabilities. Thus, it is clear to see that whilst the US may be reluctant to foot the bill of their ally’s defence for much longer, this could in fact prove to be a far lower cost to their economy than the alternative.

• European economic issues: The withdrawal of US funding for its allies would also leave Europe in a difficult position where it would have to shoulder a far greater burden on defence spending. This comes at a time when inflation, lack of growth and ageing populations plague many European states. If European nations were forced to increase their spending in defence this could exacerbate the effects of wider economic problems. The negative effects of the war in Ukraine have already been felt across Europe. The war has led energy prices to skyrocket and only severe government intervention protected European citizens from massive increases in their energy bills (though the rises were nonetheless significant). This coupled with the economic effects of Covid-19 have created the high inflationary ecosystem that we are seeing today.

At present, Europe finds itself in a difficult situation. To continue to support Ukraine and shoulder a greater burden of defence spending could further damage their economies at a time when significant investment is needed in other areas. Many European nations can likely afford to spend more on their defence, however, to also support Ukraine would be a significant burden. Thus, the current state of US politics and how it relates to funding NATO partners and Ukraine is worth keeping an eye on for anyone living or working in Europe as it will directly affect the economies of the continent.

The Ripple Effects of an Isolationist US

With funding for the war in Ukraine unlikely to pass through the House of Representatives and a second Trump presidency looking increasingly likely it is important to explore the worst-case scenarios.

Whilst it is unlikely that Russia would be able to completely overrun Ukraine over the short term, it is feasible that Russia extends its influence over Ukraine and then begins to cast its eye towards other Eastern European nations over the medium term. If the US fails to offer greater levels of funding to Ukraine and begins to undermine its NATO obligations, then other NATO nations will be forced to ensure their security. This development may see us return to a multipolar world, with Europe reluctantly taking its place as a pole alongside the US, Russia and China.  Whilst the wealthier Western European NATO members would likely be able to adapt to this, countries in the Baltic would be exposed to Russian advances. This raises stark security concerns for these nations, whilst increasing threats for individuals and businesses that operate in these areas. Such threats would also be vulnerable elsewhere, namely with Taiwan,  which is facing an increasingly assertive China. Following Taiwan’s recent elections, China could see an opportunity to test the US’s resolve to commit resources to Asia as well as Europe. Whatever the case, it seems that a world in which America rolls back its commitments to protect its allies and combat those who threaten democracies is becoming a distinct possibility, one that would have an array of far-reaching consequences.

Author: Jason Cooper, Associate Analyst, Northcott Global Solutions

Contact: risk@northcottglobalsolutions.com

Northcott Global Solutions provides risk assessments, tracking, security escorts, personal protective equipment, remote medical assistance and emergency evacuation.

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